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Abstract
Recently, some proponents and practitioners of inconsistent mathe-
matics have argued that the subject requires a conditional with ir-
relevant features, i.e. where antecedent and consequent in a valid
conditional do not behave as expected in relevance logics —by shar-
ing propositional variables, for example. Here we argue that more
fine-grained notions of content and content-sharing are needed to ex-
amine the language of (inconsistent) arithmetic and set theory, and
that the conditionals needed in inconsistent mathematics are not as
irrelevant as it is suggested in the current literature.
1 Introduction
The question we are interested in here is how much irrelevance is needed
in logic for inconsistent mathematics, the program aiming at keeping some
näıve principles (which are known to produce contradictions) with a logic
weak enough to coexist with them without triviality, but strong enough to
recapture a good amount of the most important part (results and proofs) of
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its classical counterpart while obtaining new results.1 This is important be-
cause according to Weber ([26], [27]) and some of his collaborators (see [12],
[2], [13]), a conditional that obeys an irrelevant conditional-introduction rule
appears to be indispensable in mathematical proofs and some statements of
the form ‘φ entails ψ’ are true even when the entailment makes use of back-
ground assumptions other than φ, or does not use φ at all. In a nutshell,
their claim is that an irrelevant conditional is needed for inconsistent math-
ematics.2 However, the concerns about the dates back at least to Meyer’s
proof that (m = n)→ (k = k) is valid in his relevant arithmetic R# and, in
the context of set theory, his remark that one can prove (x = y)→ (p↔ p).
These latter conditionals seem objectionable because apparently their respec-
tive antecedents and consequents are irrelevant to each other.
In spite of these results, our answer to the opening question is, boldly,
that irrelevance has no place in inconsistent mathematics. Less boldly, and
following some hints by Meyer himself and Brady, our answer is that the evi-
dence provided thus far only shows that that sort of conditionals are at least
weakly relevant in a sense to be made precise below. Much more argument
would be needed to say that mathematics requires irrelevant proof methods,
or that one can prove irrelevant conditionals in mathematics by following
1Although inconsistent mathematics is yet to be fully developed, there are already
some notable results. See for example the seminal compendium [17], and see [6] for set
theory in particular; later developments can be found in [18], [28], [30]. We deliberately
omit the approach to mathematics using paraconsistent logic in the style of da Costa and
his followers, as such a tradition typically does not work under the assumption that the
näıve principles hold good. Rather, they take classical mathematics and classical logic
as correct to a great extent, but due to limitative theorems such as Gödel’s, according
to which contradictions in those theories are possible, they offer means to cope with the
contradictions if they happen to arise sometime. See [8] for an overview of the achievements
of the (post-)da Costa approach. A more akin approach is the one based on adaptive
logics; nonetheless, a useful comparison would require too many detours beyond the scope
of this paper. The interested reader might consult [25] for a quick glance at the sort of
achievements of the adaptive approach.
2But it has to be avoided in some parts of the theory. For example, a conditional
satisfying Weakening, that is,
Weakening Γ, A ` Γ, B → A
cannot be used in the formulation of the axiom of Extensionality in inconsistent set theory
on pain of triviality, it needs to be another conditional; see [28] and [13, p. 376]. In a
slightly different context, Field, Lederman and Øgaard ([11]) have also insisted on the
validity of Weakening.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:5) 2021, Article no. 12
505
relevantly acceptable proof methods.
This sort of project need not be based on a “logic first” approach. We
might agree pretty much with the practitioners of inconsistent mathematics
that mathematical needs are going to drive the shape of the logic, so we
are not suggesting a change in the logic(s) they have already “field-tested”.
Rather, we are questioning the description of what is going in certain aspects
of inconsistent mathematics, because it seems odd, whether in classical or
inconsistent mathematics, to assert that mathematicians need to prove irrel-
evant conditionals, especially if that means that antecedent and consequent
do not have anything to do with each other. But in order to investigate
whether the conditionals have anything to do with each other —i.e. whether
they share content or are relevant to each other—, we need more than the
Variable Sharing Principle (VSP) or anything in that ballpark, because all
those principles were designed for the minimum non-logical bit of zero-order
languages. Surprisingly, the VSP made its way as a necessary condition for
relevance in higher-order languages too, in spite that there is more content
bearers to be analyzed and taken into account in them.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we present the alleged
cases of irrelevance in inconsistent mathematics. In Section 2 we outline a
theory of weak content that allows for certain conditionals, including the
problematic ones in Section 1, to be regarded as at least weakly relevant. In
Section 3 we discuss how that proposal might face a problem if set-theoretic
reductionism is true.
For simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to arithmetic and set theory.
Fitch-style natural deduction would be our preferred format for deploying
and analyzing proofs. In the Appendix you can find a handy presentation of
DKQ, which would facilitate the reading of this note for those not familiar
with that logic.
2 The Evidence for Irrelevance
Famously, Meyer [16, pp. 31 and 36f] proved that (m = n)→ (k = k) is valid
in R#, i.e. Peano arithmetic formulated with the logic R as background logic.
Here is a sketch of the proof (here and in what follows we omit reiterations
for simplicity):
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1 (x− x) = 0 Elementary algebra
2 (0 + k) = k Elementary algebra
3 m = n Hypothesis
4 n = m Symmetry of =, 3
5 m = m Transitivity of =, 3, 4
6 (m−m) = (m−m) Replacement, 5
7 0 = 0 Substitution, 1, 6
8 (0 + k) = (0 + k) Replacement, 7
9 k = k Substitution, 2, 8
10 (m = n)→ (k = k) I→, 3––10
This means that any equation with a numerical term, regardless of whether
it is true or false, entails any true numerical equation.
This result has motivated a number of reactions. Meyer, for example,
considered “slightly surprising” and was hesitant between consider it as a
fallacy of relevance or rather as an argument for strong relations of mutual
relevance between arithmetic propositions [16, p. 31]. Dunn [9, p. 367] is
slightly less hesitant: “[t]his is surely somewhat surprising, and smacks of
irrelevance.” Brady [5, p. 158] also sees a problem of irrelevance:
m = n → m′ = n′, which has the natural numbers m and n in
common, leads to 0 = 0 → 100 = 100, where the two numbers
involved can be as far apart as you like. Here, the only relevance
between ‘0’ and ‘100’ is the fact that they are both natural num-
bers, which is not the same as saying that there is some number
in common. So, the relevance is of a different and lesser type
than that which would appear to be required by the Relevance
Condition [i.e. the Variable-Sharing Principle]. A more straight-
forwardly irrelevant case, due to Meyer, is m = n→ l = l, which
is derivable using transitivity and symmetry, together with the
above principle (. . . ).
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Routley’s verdict is harsher and declares R# irrelevant and filled with
“embarrassing difficulties” (see [22, p. 901]). He blames the step from 7 to 8
in the proof above; more generally, he questions the validity of the entailment
from m = n to m + k = n + k. Like Brady, Routley suggested changing
the background logic, to his preferred DKQ, which is stronger than DJdQ
(Brady’s preferred logic), to avoid the smack of irrelevance. According to
Routley, (m = m)→ (m+n = m+n) should be corrected to (m = m∧n =
n)→ (m+ n = m+ n), just as Factor
(A↔ B)→ ((A ∧ C)↔ (B ∧ C))
should be changed to the weaker alternative:
((A↔ B) ∧ (C ↔ C))→ ((A ∧ C)↔ (B ∧ C))
In the case of (m = m ∧ n = n) → (m + n = m + n), antecedent and
consequent have a number in common; in fact, all numbers in common, as
Brady implicitly demanded.
Whatever the merits of Routley’s proposal for the case of arithmetic,
which are nicely discussed in [19], it is not enough to get rid of any smack of
irrelevance in all areas of inconsistent mathematics. Problematic conditionals
similar in form to Meyer’s have recently been discussed by Weber and Istre
in the context of inconsistent set theory. An inconsistent set theory would
be a theory based on the following two axioms:
(Unrestricted) Comprehension ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ Φ(x, u))
Extensionality ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)↔ x = y
These are known to produce contradictions since Russell (and even Cantor),
and there has been a lot of debate on what is the best logic to use for such a
theory. Nowadays, the best candidates live around Routley’s DKQ. For our
purposes, we will stick to that logic; it has a very straightforward natural
deduction presentation and it will facilitate exposition and discussion. Thus,
in what follows, ‘inconsistent set theory’ will mean ‘DKQ-based näıve set
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theory’ unless otherwise stated.3
Among the results that are typically expected to be recovered in incon-
sistent set theory are the certain set inclusions, like the fact that an empty
set is a subset of any other set, the equality of sets containing exactly the
same members or Mostowski’s Collapsing Lemma. These results are impor-
tant because usually they serve to guarantee that sets have expected and
important properties. However, Weber [29] and Istre [12] have argued that
proving these requires Weakening. (Field, Lederman and Øgaard [11] make
a similar point.)
Let us start with inclusion of an empty set in any other set, defining an
empty set as a set y with no elements, that is, such that ∀x(x /∈ y). The usual
proof that y is a subset of any other set, i.e. ∀z(y ⊆ z), cannot go through
because it proceeds via a reductio inadmissible in DKQ, so a different path
should be tried to prove ∀x(x /∈ y) → ∀z(y ⊆ z). In order to prove the
consequent, one has to prove x ∈ y → x ∈ z. But this does not go any
further. Contraposing, one gets x /∈ z → x /∈ y. But the consequent of that
conditional already obtains by the hypothesis that ∀x(x /∈ y), and nothing
but Weakening would do the rest of the job.
Let us move now to the equality of sets. The problem of proving equality
from co-extensionality has been in the air for a while.4 For example, Weber
[27] considered the special case of the equality of two universal sets. Consider
the following two sets of a näıve set theory:
U = {x : x = x}
V = {x : ∃y(x ∈ y)}
Both sets have all objects as members, that is, ∀x(x ∈ U) and ∀x(x ∈ V ).
To show U = V , would require a proof that x ∈ V → x ∈ U , and Weber
thinks that there is no such proof with a relevant conditional because ∃y(x ∈
y)→ (x = x) is irrelevant. The easy proof would go as follows:
3One might wonder whether the problems to be discussed below could be avoided in
going straightly to Brady’s DJdQ. The answer is negative. The only difference between
DJdQ and DKQ is their treatment of conditionals of the form A →∼ A: provided it is
a theorem, in DKQ one can infer ∼ A from it, but in DJdQ one cannot even do that.
However, no such move is involved in the proofs discussed below. More recently, Brady has
advocated an even weaker logic, MC, see [7], but as far as the proofs below are concerned,
the situation is very much like as with DJdQ and DKQ.
4At least since [3].
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1 ∀x(x ∈ U ↔ x = x){} Comp.
2 ∀x(x ∈ V ↔ ∃y(x ∈ y)){} Comp.
3 x ∈ V{1} Hypothesis
4 ∃y(x ∈ y){1} E∀x and E↔, 2, 3
5 x = x{} Reflexivity of =
6 x ∈ U{} E∀x and E↔, 1, 5
7 x ∈ V → x ∈ U{} I→, 2––6
but it is invalid, because the I→ rule cannot be validly applied on step
7 in the logic DKQ. This kind of result means that, in inconsistent set
theory, “having the same stuff” is not enough for two sets being equal, but
they also must “have the same stuff for similar reasons”. This is due to set
equality being tied tightly to a conditional formula by Extensionality and by
set instantiation being tied so tightly to properties.
An example of having the same stuff for the same reasons is the classical
proof of the equality of two finite sets. Consider for example a = {0, 1, 2}
and b = {0, 1, 2}, which goes as follows:
1 ∀x(x ∈ a↔ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ x = 2)){} Comp.
2 ∀x(x ∈ b↔ (x = 0 ∨ x = 1 ∨ x = 2)){} Comp.
3 0 ∈ a{1}
4 0 ∈ a↔ (0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 1 ∨ 0 = 2){} E∀x x/0, 1
5 (0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 1 ∨ 0 = 2){1} E↔, 4, 3
6 0 ∈ b↔ (0 = 0 ∨ 0 = 1 ∨ 0 = 2){} E∀x x/0, 2
7 0 ∈ b{1} E↔, 6, 5
8 0 ∈ a→ 0 ∈ b{} I→, 3––7
where a and b have the same elements exactly for the same reason, namely
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that they instantiate Comprehension in the same way.5
As we have said, Mostowski’s Collapsing Lemma is another example of a
piece of mathematics that is expected to be recovered in inconsistent math-
ematics. The usual proof is not going to work because it proceeds with a
reductio inadmissible in DKQ. The usual proof is long and definitely not as
elementary as the previous one, so we will not reproduce it here, but it can
be found for example in [14, Ch. 6].
In inconsistent mathematics, that the needed function exists is straight-
forward because this is a simple instantiation of näıve Comprehension. How-
ever, when trying to prove the injectivity of the function, problems arise.
Istre [12, p. 56] describes the situation as follows (we have adjusted a little
bit the notation):
We would need to derive from our assumption f(x) = f(y) that
∀z(Rzx) ↔ Rzy to take advantage of our assumption that R
is extensional and thus get x = y. Given the definition of f ,
we would need to start by first showing that if some Rax then
f(a) ∈ f(x) as a relevant implication. This move is not possible
because it requires Rax → (Rax ∧ f(a) = f(a)) but the second
conjunct is irrelevant to Rax. [12, p. 57]
Istre considers other cases where Weakening could be needed. He presents
the following hypothetical case:
Mathematical proofs usually take advantage of assumptions which
operate as “contextual information”, like in the statement “if x
and y are ordinals, x ∈ On and y ∈ On, then x ⊆ y or y ⊆ x”.
That x and y are ordinals is meant to be used to derive the result.
There are a few different paths we could take for such a proof,
but the following exhibits the problem.
Assume we attempt to prove to show that x ⊆ y directly after
assuming some instances of LEM. This requires proving that z ∈
x→ z ∈ y. Since x was arbitrary, we don’t know the set property
that defined x and so we can’t move forward from z ∈ x. We
need to use that x is an ordinal to imply some formula A(z), i.e.
x ∈ On ` A(z). Suppose that this property about z is enough to
5Actually, this example was introduced by Istre [12, p. 32] as a case for the need of
Weakening, but the proof is valid in DKQ without relying on Weakening.
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get A(z) → z ∈ y. It is weakening which would allow us to say
that
x ∈ On ` z ∈ x→ A(z)
and thus that
x ∈ On ` z ∈ x→ z ∈ y.
Without weakening, we can make no such inference. The use of
the assumed information breaks the connection needed for the
relevant implication. [12, pp. 34f]
And then he adds on a footnote: “This appears to be another example where
weakening plays a unique role in set theory.”6 Here is a sketch of the (hypo-
thetical) proof in natural deduction:
1 y ∈ On{1} Hypothesis
2 x ∈ On{1} Hypothesis
3 z ∈ x{2} Hypothesis
...
...
n A(z)m ..., 2
...
...
m A(z)→ z ∈ yk ...
m+ 1 z ∈ ym,k E→, n, m
m+ 2 z ∈ x→ z ∈ y{m,k}−2 I→, 3–m+ 1
m+ 3 x ⊆ y{m,k}−2 def., m+ 2
m+ 4 x ⊆ y ∨ y ⊆ x{m,k}−2 I∨, m+ 3
6These conditionals are discussed again, although in a broader context, in [13].
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where 1, 2 ∈ m. Note that, according to Istre, step 3 is not used at all —
beyond serving to start the conditional proof— to prove step m+ 1. Hence,
step m+2 would be a case of Weakening. The case is too abstract to analyze
the proof further. However, it seems to us that step n would be proved not
only with step 2, but that substantial use of 3 would also be made: that z
has the property A would hardily be obtained simply from the fact that x is
an ordinal, but also from the fact that z is an element of x.7 However, let
us grant Istre that it is an instance of Weakening, and that step 3 is in fact
“deductively inert”. That will not affect our main claim in the end of Section
3, that it is but a special, restricted form of Weakening requiring some sort
of relevance which allows proving step m+ 2.
Before moving further, let us recall that for Routley and Brady, Meyer’s
arithmetical conditionals should be fixed by moving to a weaker logic than
R, and that for Weber and Istre, irrelevance is a fact that one should live
with in inconsistent mathematics. But not all relevantists share those views.
Mortensen thinks, echoing [16, p. 27] that the conditionals above constitute
no worry at all: “irrelevance is a property of the theorems and deducibility
of logics, not of the nonlogical theorems of arithmetical theories.” ([19, 219],
italics in the original.) We do not aim to settle the discussion here; we
simply take sides with those who think that (ir)relevance can be predicated
of mathematical conditionals.8
3 Introducing Weak q-Relevance
Note the similarity between Istre’s and Weber’s Rax → (f(a) = f(a)) and
∃y(x ∈ y) → (x = x), respectively, and Meyer’s (m = n) → (k = k). As
we saw from Brady’s quote in the last section, the first source of the sense of
irrelevance arises because one would expect that any valid conditional A→ B
in a relevant theory satisfies the variable-sharing property (VSP):
7Note that we are not assuming here that if x is an ordinal then x is such and such.
Rather, we are saying that it is difficult to get that z is such and such without relying on
the fact that z belongs to x.
8And of any conditionals, we would add. Many references from relevance logicians
speaking of relevance and irrelevance of all sorts of conditionals could be mentioned here.
To use just one, Mares [15] counts among the “intolerable irrelevancies” the following
examples of conditionals: “that any false arithmetical equivalence implies any identity
statement”; “cicero = catiline → A, for every proposition A”; and even “cicero = cicero
→ tully = tully”.
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VSP A→ B is a theorem only if there is a propositional variable occurring
both in A and B.
According to the VSP, the content of a formula is the set of its propositional
variables. But (m = n) → (k = k) is of the form A → B, more precisely,
p → q, because antecedent and consequent are atomic, and do not share
propositional variables. Mutatis mutandis, something similar can be said of
both Rax→ (f(a) = f(a)) and ∃y(x ∈ y)→ (x = x). Hence, irrelevance.
But irrelevance comes in degrees. For example, the following conditionals
are not equally irrelevant:
(1) p→ (q → p)
(2) q → (p→ p)
(3) (q → q)→ (p→ p)
(4) p→ (p→ p)
(1), an instance of Positive Paradox, is a “dread relevance destroyer”9 and
cannot be added to a logic in the relevance family without collapsing it in
classical logic, and the same happens with (2). Prior famously held that para-
doxes of strict implication might in fact be proofs that “necessary and impos-
sible propositions as such have a definite inner connexion with all propositions
whatever”[20, p. 196,; italics in the original]. This cannot be unrestrictedly
the case in relevance logics, for (2) implies a collapse equal to (1). But the
“definite inner connection” between any two necessary implications, as in (3),
can be added to relevance logics without collapse, producing the I logics, for
example.10 Even more, the definite inner connection can be assumed for a
necessary proposition and any contingent proposition occurring in it, as in
(4), which has lead to RM and other “Minglish” logics.11
The fact that (1) is so irrelevant in spite of meeting the VSP suggests
that another condition for relevance, necessary at least, and stronger than
VSP, is operating in R. Such a condition, introduced in [1, Ch. IV, §22.1.3],
is the
9As Dunn [9, p. 355] colorfully calls it.
10See [21] for a more detailed examination of these logics.
11RM has been widely studied by relevance logicians. For the basics, see [1, §29.4].
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No-loose pieces property (NLPP) if A→ B is a purely implicative the-
orem, every variable occurs in A if and only if it occurs in B.
Also, not as important but also highly desirable is the
Ackermann property (AP) there is no theorem of the form A → (B →
C) where A contains no ‘→’.
The following table systematizes the features of the conditionals above:
NLPP VSP AD
p→ (q → p) × X ×
q → (p→ p) × × ×
(q → q)→ (p→ p) × × X
p→ (p→ p) X X ×
It shows clearly that (1) and (2) are totally inadmissible. (3) is bad but there
is some redemption for it if one is liberal enough. (4) is bad but it is the
least bad of the four given these desiderata.12
That (3) can be added to R without collapsing it in classical logic means
that VSP and NLPP can be relaxed in a way that (1) and (2) are still out of
the relevance realm. In fact, in the literature there are other, more liberal,
necessary conditions for relevance, reflecting the differences between these
conditionals.13 A relaxed condition that can make room for (3) is ultra-weak
relevance (UwR):
UwR A → B is valid only if A and B share a propositional variable or a
connective.
According to this, the content of a formula is the set of its propositional
variables or connectives. As we have said, this allows going beyond R to the
I systems, where schemes like (3) above, (B → B)→ (A→ A), are valid.
12One could wonder why (3) is better than (1) if both meet just one of the desiderata.
The short story is that (3) scores better by relevantists’ lights because in (3) not only
an entailment is entailed by another entailment, unlike in (1), but also both antecedent
and consequent in (3) share modal status; that a necessary entailment entails another
necessary entailment is less objectionable than having an atomic, contingent proposition
entailing a necessary entailment.
13For an overview of some of those conditions, see [23].
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Although UwR does not help for our present purposes—(m = n)→ (k =
k) still has the propositional structure p → q—, it does give a good hint
on what is needed, namely, considering the more fine-grained structure of
propositions so that the shareable content is not exhausted with propositional
variables or the connectives connecting them. VSP and UwR as stated cover
just zero-order logic and would render invalid conditionals like Fa → ∃xFx
and ∀xFx→ Fa, which are prima facie not relevantly objectionable. Thus,
let us define weak q-content as follows:
Weak q-content The weak q-content of A is the set of its terms and (rele-
vant) predicates.
This allows us to define weak q-relevance as follows:
Weak q-relevance A→ B is valid only if A and B share weak q-content,
where sharing is understood as set intersection.14
Clearly, (m = n)→ (k = k) is at least weakly q-relevant; moreover, (m = n)
is used in the proof of (k = k), the latter is not simply introduced as a
logical truth. Note that Brady and perhaps also Routley demand some-
thing stronger, namely that the q-content is just the set of terms and that
antecedent and consequent in a valid conditional have the same q-content.
Let us consider now the problematic set-theoretic conditionals of Section
1:
(W1) x /∈ z → x /∈ y
(W2) 0 ∈ b→ 0 ∈ a
(W3) ∃y(x ∈ y)→ (x = x)
(W4) Rax→ (f(a) = f(a))
Note that, in each case, the antecedent is not that arbitrary with respect
to the consequent: they share at least terms, and some of them share also
(relevant) predicates, so they all are at least weakly q-relevant to each other.
Now, as in the case of the irrelevant formulas (1)-(4) above, there is a
way in which one can systematize the dissatisfaction with (W1)-(W4):
14The reader can decide what the ‘q’ means here. It can stand for ‘quantificational
structure’, ‘quasi-relevance’ or whatnot.













x /∈ z → x /∈ y X X X
0 ∈ b→ 0 ∈ a X X X
∃y(x ∈ y)→ (x = x) X × ×
Rax→ (f(a) = f(a)) X × ×
All of them look suspicious because they fail VSP. Nonetheless, a more de-
tailed examination of the atomic propositions show that in all cases there
is more fined-grained content shared between the components of these con-
ditionals. Also, the dissatisfaction with (W3) and (W4) is greater because
they score really low, although still they keep the minimum of relevance
which prevents the need for unrestricted Weakening in full force. In that
sense, (W3) and (W4) resemble Mingle: a necessary consequent, that can be
proved on its own, is implied by a contingent proposition. Nonetheless, there
is some redemption to Mingle because that contingent proposition occurs in
the necessary one, unlike the case of q → (p → p). The situation is pretty
much the same with (W3) and (W4).
The W conditionals are unlike (m = n) → (k = k) in that their an-
tecedents are not used at all in proving the consequent; in the proofs of those
conditionals, the antecedents are mere hypotheses to start the conditional
proof. However, it is easy to see then that the rule needed in these examples
of “irrelevant” deductions is not Weakening tout court but
Restricted Weakening If Γ ` A then Γ ` B → A provided that A and
B share at least weak q-content.
To finalize this section, let us note that there is a “smack of irrelevance”
already in the axioms that would be nice to cover with our suggestion.15
As for Extensionality, a universally quantified biconditional is connected to
an identity with a biconditional. In this case, antecedents and consequents
in both conditionals share terms, x and y. For Comprehension, we have
a biconditional between a membership statement and some arbitrary other
statement Φ(x, u) that could just be e.g. some proposition p. In the original
formulation, the membership statement x ∈ y and the statement Φ(x, u)
15Thanks to Zach Weber for pressing us to discuss this point.
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share terms, which is lost if the latter is re-written as ‘p’, as Meyer and
others found. Here is where the “syntactic” approaches to content-sharing
find their limit, because they are too sensitive to language manipulation.
Nonetheless, we hope to have showed that the attempt of showing that the
smack of irrelevance in axioms is not real, full irrelevance, is not hopeless.
4 (Restricted) Weakening and Set-Theoretic
Reductionism
But happy endings are not the norm in inconsistent mathematics. Sup-
pose material set-theoretic reductionism, the idea that every mathematical
statement is equivalent to one about sets and membership between them, is
true. Then any two mathematical statements are at least weakly q-relevant
to each other as the membership relation is shared among any two math-
ematical statements. If that is so, the proverbial conjecture about Banach
spaces (B) is relevant both to the completeness of first-order calculus (C)
and to Fermat’s Last Theorem (F ). But this seems to go against the original
relevantist desiderata.16
One can try to get rid of this worry by pointing out that even if B is
relevant to C, in the sense that they share (weak q-)content, that is not
enough for the validity of B → C: at least a proof of C that uses B is
needed. (And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for B → F .) However, under
set-theoretic reductionism, Restricted Weakening collapses into Weakening
simpliciter: any conditional A → B, with B a theorem, is valid, because
the restriction is automatically satisfied given that set-theoretic membership
would be present in any formula.
We will not try to find a way out of this conundrum here, but there are
many options available. Nonetheless, we are not to develop them fully nor
evaluate them properly here; that would require a separate work. First, there
is the option of rejecting the idea that membership is a relevant property.
This would be problematic because membership satisfies the best working
definition of relevant property, that of Dunn [9, p. 357]. A less radical idea
would be exploring membership as a relevant property but only of the con-
16The problem will arise for any signature with only one (n-ary) predicate. For definite-
ness, and for its central role in foundational discussions, we stick to the particular case of
set theory.
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taining set, not of the member, that is, giving radically different logical treat-
ments to the properties “having x as a member” and “being a member of y”,
as suggested by Dunn himself in [10, p. 90f]). Having the elements that it
has could be a relevant property of a set, but belonging to this or that set in
general could be not relevant for the members. Modifying Dunn’s example
a little bit, having ∅ and France as members is a relevant property of {∅,
France}, but belonging to {∅, France} does not seem a relevant property of
either ∅ or France.
Finally, there is the option of considering set-theoretic reductionism false
in the case of inconsistent mathematics. There are some arguments to the
effect that it is very implausible for set theories based on logics in the vicinity
of LP; see for example [24]. Set theories based on logics at least as strong
as DKQ seem to contain too much “noise”, that is, extraneous inconsistent
facts, such as (r ∈ r ∧ r /∈ r) →∼ (r ∈ r → r ∈ r). Moreover, sets like
Routley’s —the set Z of all sets not belonging to Z; see [22]— appear to
generate an enormous amount of inconsistency at all levels; for example,
everything belongs and does not belong to it and, moreover, it might make
all arguments invalid (even if some are valid too). Up to now, it is unclear
whether these features of an inconsistent set theory would have an impact
on the reconstruction of other mathematical theories within it.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed the notions of weak q-content and weak q-
relevance to defend the thesis that certain conditionals in inconsistent math-
ematics are not completely irrelevant, in the sense that their antecedents
and consequents do not share content. This would alleviate, at least par-
tially, some concerns raised by certain theorems proved by Meyer in relevant
arithmetic, like (m = n) → (k = k). Those notions are also useful in show-
ing that some apparent uses of unrestricted Weakening in mathematics are
actually instances of a restricted version of such a rule. It is important to
emphasize that we are not defending the idea that (in general) this shows
that unrestricted Weakening is not necessary for inconsistent mathematics,
but rather that the evidence provided so far for the contrary is insufficient.
We believe that the most important conclusion to be drawn from this work
is that a notion of relevance that encompass a fine-grained notion of logical
content, besides just propositional content, is most necessary. We believe
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that an adequate notion of logical content must include an account of the
content involved in terms or predicates, which seems important in cases like
those exposed by Meyer, Routley, Brady, Weber, Istre and others. It is our
hope that this note advanced the discussion in that direction.
Appendix: DKQ





2. (A ∧B)→ A
3. (A ∧B)→ B
4. ((A→ B) ∧ (A→ C))→ (A→ (B ∧ C))
5. A→ (A ∨B)
6. B → (A ∨B)
7. ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C))→ ((A ∨B)→ C)
8. (A ∧ (B ∨ C))→ ((A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C))
9. ∼∼ A→ A
10. (A→∼ B)→ (B →∼ A)
11. ((A→ B) ∧ (B → C))→ (A→ C)
12. A∨ ∼A
13. ∀xA→ A[y/x], y free for x in A
14. ∀x(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀xB), x not free in A
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15. ∀x(A ∨B)→ (A ∨ ∀xB), x not free in A
16. A[y/x]→ ∃xA, y free for x in A
17. ∀x(A→ B)→ (∃xA→ B), x not free in B
18. (A ∧ ∃xB)→ ∃x(A ∧B), x not free in A
Rules
R1. A,A→ B ` B
R2. A,B ` A ∧B
R3. A→ B,C → D ` ((B → C)→ (A→ D))
R4. A ` ∀xA
R5. x = y ` A(x)→ A(y)
Natural Deduction System for DKQ
Hyp. A formula A may be introduced as the hypothesis of a new subproof,
with a subscript {k}, where k is the rank of the new subproof
Reit. Aa may be reiterated to the right into any subproof containing Aa
retaining the index set a
→ I From a proof of Ba on the hypothesis A{k}, to infer A→ Ba−{k} in the
next outer subproof, providedk ∈ a
→ E From Aa and A → Bb to infer Ba∪b, provided the DKQ-restriction
holds
∼ I From A→∼ A∅ to infer ∼ A∅, provided the DKQ-restriction holds
∼ E From ∼ Ba and A→ Bb to infer ∼ Aa∪b, provided the DKQ-restriction
holds
∼∼I From Aa to infer ∼∼ Aa
∼∼E From ∼∼ Aa to infer Aa
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∧I From Aa and Ba to infer A ∧Ba
∧E From A ∧Ba to infer Aa
From A ∧Ba to infer Ba
∨I From Aa to infer A ∨Ba
From Ba to infer A ∨Ba
∨E From A ∨ Ba, A → Cb and B → Cb to infer Ca∪b, provided the DKQ-
restriction holds
∧∨ From A ∧ (B ∨ C) to infer (A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧ C)
∀xI From Aa to infer ∀xAa provided x is not free in any hypothesis H{k}
with k ∈ a
∀xE From ∀xAa to infer A[y/x]a where y is free for x in A
∀x∨ From ∀x(A ∨B)a to infer A ∨ ∀xBa, where x is not free in A
∃xI From A[y/x]a to infer ∃xAa where y is free for x in A
∃xE From ∃xAa and ∀x(A→ B)b to infer Ba∪b where x is not free in B and
provided DKQ-restriction holds
∃x∧ From A ∧ ∃xBa to infer ∃x(A ∧B)a where x is not free in A
DKQ-Restriction If b 6= ∅ then (i) a 6= ∅, (ii) max(b) < max(a) and (iii)
a− {max(a)} = a or ∅
Finally, A ↔ B is defined as (A → B) ∧ (B → A) as expected, so the rules
of introduction and elimination for ↔ are much the same rules for ∧, with
the DKQ-restriction in the elimination.
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